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By making a distinction between public and private preferences, the paper 
presents a dual preference model depicting possible responses (i.e., exit, sincere 
voice and self-subversion) to social pressures from two opposing pressure groups.  
Exit is deserting the setting; sincere voice is publicly expressing dissatisfaction and 
self-subversion is the misrepresentation of one’s private preference under social 
pressures. Exit and sincere voice involve prohibitive costs, making self-subversion 
the superior option.  Massive self-subversion polarizes the society, harboring 
multiple social equilibria with oscillating public opinion.  In an effort to dominate 
the public discourse, each rival pressure group opts for favorable corner equilibrium.  
The paper applies the dual preference model to Turkey where two kinds of self-
subversion appear in response to competing Islamist and secularist social projects.  
Islamist pressures lead to pro-Islamist self-subversion, and secularist pressures to 
pro-secularist self-subversion, resulting in the polarization of the Turkish public 
opinion along Islamists vs. Secularists.  Three field experiments with 450 
respondents provide empirical support for the model’s conclusions.  The paper ends 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Turkey, Islamists and secularists have long battled to control public 
opinion.  Secularists have attempted to lock religion into the private sphere.  
For their part, Islamists have strived for more public visibility.  On each side, 
activists have exerted tremendous pressures on the non-activist majority, 
trying to make ordinary individuals act as if they are committed to their own 
position.  In order to determine the non-activist majority’s responses to 
Islamist and secularist pressures, we have conducted three identical field 
experiments over the last decade (1998, 2004, and 2008) as follows:  In both 
experiments, a pair of interviewers carried out interviews in sets of three, 
administering them identically, except for the types of accessories used by 
the interviewers.  In one interview, the interviewers carried Islamist symbols.  
In the other, secularist symbols were used.  Lastly, in the neutral interview, 
the interviewers had no symbols at all.  While the three hundred participants 
revealed more or less similar responses to the questions not related to 
religion, the questions on secularism and Islamism yielded extremely 
significant changes in the participants’ revealed preferences at the level of 
(p<0.005).  The field experiments clearly showed that people dissimulated 
their revealed preferences on controversial issues and taboos in response to 
perceived pressures.  By using Turkey as a case study, this paper presents an 
improved version of Kuran’s (1995) dual preference model depicting all the 
possible individual responses under social pressures.  It also theorizes on the 
unintended consequences of such responses on the social equilibria both 
stable and unstable.  The model also enables us to contemplate on the future 
of Turkish society. 
 
2  A DUAL PREFERENCE MODEL 
 
Let us take a hot public issue on which two rival pressure groups (i.e., 
Islamist and secularists) advocate diametrically opposing policies and 
campaign to win public opinion to their side as a source of political power:  
The issue could be veiling, liquor licensing, the prohibition of alcohol, 
regulation of prostitution in the state designated areas or the ban on interest.  
Each member in society one way or another has at least some opinion on 
these topics.  Yet, in a charged public environment, especially the moderate 
members may find it difficult to adhere to their unique position when faced 
pressures from opposing Islamist and secularist camps.   
 
Before stepping into the public sphere, each individual in the society 
first must decide by herself on her genuine opinion regarding Islamism and 
secularism.  This constitutes her private preference that is only known to 
her.  Then, she must decide which group to support and to what degree, 3  Tolga Koker 
through speech and action, by declaring a public preference.  There is no 
guarantee that an individual will genuinely display her private preferences in 
public.  This forms the basis of the dual preference model in which the 
individual drives separate utilities from holding private and public 
preferences. 
 
2.1 Intrinsic  Utility 
 
First think of an individual who must make a decision in a secret ballot 
referendum, e.g., the abolition or strict enforcement of the ban on the veil in 
schools and public offices.  A pious Muslim is likely to vote YES for the 
abolition whereas a secular citizen may vote NO for the abolition.  In a 
secret ballot, an individual will vote for the option that provides her the 
greatest intrinsic utility on the issue in question by doing cost-benefit 
analysis.  Independent of what the individual does under social pressure, the 
intrinsic utility depends on her private preference represented by 
 
 I  =  I  (x),          (1) 
 
where x represents her private preference towards veiling -- the preference 
that the individual has in her heart   I(x) is assumed to be concave, and the 
private preference, x* maximizes the intrinsic utility when the individual is 
true to herself.  A veiled pious Muslim female derives utmost inner 
satisfaction as she knows that she is pleasing Allah.  An unveiled woman, a 
strong believer in the secular dress code, enjoys intrinsic utility from being 
secular.  Their values range from 0 (extreme Islamist, veiled) to 100 
(extreme secularist, unveiled) such that x*Î[0, 100].  Hence, the individual 
private preferences constitute a continuum between complete veiling of 
women in both public and private domains on the one extreme and complete 
unveiling on the other.  Intrinsic utility function is, at its maximum, denoted 
by I (x*) and is fixed for every individual at Î such that Î = I(x*=0) = … = 
I(x*=100) for all x* Î[0, 100].  By assumption, each individual preference 
leans towards either the Islamist side or the secularist side on the issue of 
veiling along with others such that no neutral person reveals a preference of 
x*=50.  Although private preferences may change over time, the pace of 
change is very likely to be slow so that we can treat preferences as fixed in 
the short run. 
 
If the individual derives only intrinsic utility she will clearly set her public 
and private preferences equal to each other to optimize her happiness. 
However, in the presence of social pressure, she will have to decide on 
whether to conform to the social norms of “acceptable” lifestyles, which fits Choice Under Pressure, 4 
with the society’s choice. This brings us to the other sources of utility for an 
individual who enters the public realm. 
 
2.2 Reputational  Utility 
 
If an individual prefers not to wear socks, her preference is a non-issue since 
it is considered a matter of personal choice.  However, this is not the case for 
veiling.  The activity of veiling itself becomes a political matter if it is a 
matter of social concern as in Turkey (as well as in Europe and many other 
Muslim countries) where most Islamists and secularists view the act of 
veiling as a political statement in the public sphere.  As in the act of veiling, 
we routinely state our opinions about most social issues by making our 
preferences known to others through actions, words, gestures and even 
through the way we dress in the public sphere.  When a woman steps out of 
her house veiled, she makes others know her public preference on an Islamic 
way of life.  The preferences we make known to others are our public 
preferences, y.  The net payoff we receive from the various responses to a 
public preference is our reputational utility - utility from the reputation of 
signaling that particular preference.  To the extent that our public 
preferences match others’ expectations in conformity with the accepted 
social norms and opinions, we are rewarded by their approval and respect.  
Hence, the closer our public preferences represented by y* gets to society’s 
choice, yH where H stands for “home,” the more we feel gratified in the 
public sphere.   
 
The following function relates reputational utility of an individual to 
her public preference y capturing the effect of net social rewards or 
punishments in response to her revealed public preference to determine the 
net payoff from reputational considerations: 
 
R= ρR(y), (2) 
 
where R(y) is concave in y and y∈[0, 100] and ρ is the weighting 
factor of reputational utility.  Public preference y is continuous between 0 
(extreme Islamist, veiled) and 100 (extreme secularist, unveiled).  R(y) is 
maximized at y*=0 when a completely Islamist society adopts strictly 
Islamist policies such that yH=0.  If the individual exhibits a public 
preference of y*=100 in a strictly Islamic society where yH =0, her 
reputational utility will be zero as she will be ostracized by all members of 
the society or even sentenced to prison if she takes off her veil as in Iran and 
Saudi Arabia.  On the other extreme, R(y) is maximized at y*=100 when the 
society is extremely secularist with yH=100.  She will gain acceptance in 
social circles by unveiling herself in the public.  If the individual exhibits a 5  Tolga Koker 
public preference of y*=0 in a secular society with yH=100, and veils herself, 
her reputational utility will be zero as she will be banned from work by law 
in public offices, and be disapproved in social contexts.  Note that as long as 
she strictly pursues a lifestyle in accordance with society’s preferences, she 
will maximize her reputational utility at a particular y* where y*= yH and 
R(0)=….=R(100) at their maximum.  As such, R(y) is the reputational utility 
individual expects to get from pursuing a lifestyle in conformity with the 
society’s preferences and ρ captures how “enthusiastically” the individual 
tend to advocate her public preference in the public sphere.   
 
The amount of ρ will vary with several factors. Following Bibb 
Latane’s (1981) theory of social impact, ρ can be specified as [s.i.(n)
t], a 
multiplicative function of the strength (s), immediacy (i), and the number of 
the people supporting (y).  As a superscript, (t) refers to the decreasing 
marginal effect of increased (y) supporters.  Strength (s) captures the net 
salience, power, importance, or intensity of the pressure group pressuring on 
individual to side with its worldview.  Strength results from such factors as 
of the group’s socio-economic status, ability, or motivation that creates the 
fear of seclusion for possible deviant members but offers the status for 
conforming members in a cohesive manner especially a member has a 
judgment difficulty.  It changes 0<s<1.  The more s is close to 1, the more 
individual feels the strength of the group pressure demanding him to publicly 
align with the common preference.  As s closes to 0 individual perceives the 
strength of the group on him less highly.  Another common factor affecting 
the level of conformity is immediacy (i) refering to closeness in space and 
time and lack of intervening obstacles.  It also varies 0<i<1, 0 being away 
from the pressure group and 1 being very close.  The closer the individual to 
the pressure group is the greater the influence of the group upon the 
individual (Bibb Latane, 1995).  Here the closeness refers not only to strict 
physical distance but also the social network the individual finds herself 
(Latane and L’Herrou 1996).  The last component, (n), simply shows the 
number of the people who publicly advocate (y). It is by definition n>1.  The 
more members of society approve the individual public preference the more 
individual will enjoy the reputational utility.  However, the superscript (t) as 
being t <1 implies that the group size will affect the amount of ρ at a 
decreasing rate.  In other words, there is a marginally decreasing effect of 
increased supplies of (y) advocates, implying social impact will “increase in 
proportion to some root of the number of the people” (Bibb. Latane, 1981, 
344) supporting a particular public preference.   In short, as a multiplicative 
function of strength, immediacy, and the number of the supporters, ρ 
amounts to the reputational utility an individual will enjoy from revealing a 
particular public preference.  Recall that ρ is a very subjective parameter 
since its magnitude depends on individual’s need for social approval.   Choice Under Pressure, 6 
Higher ρ means higher reputational benefits from displaying a certain public 
preference y, identical to the group’s preference, yH. 
 
Hence, while holding a particular private preference on an issue 
provides intrinsic utility, conforming to group’s norms and preferences offer 
reputational utility for the individual.  By veiling herself, a Muslim woman 
will get the satisfaction of conducting her life in accordance with Islamic 
teachings, and therefore, she feels in her heart that she is pleasing Allah.  
This is the basis of her intrinsic utility.  Her reputational utility, on the other 
hand, stems from the rewards and punishments resulting from others’ 
attitude towards her practice of veiling.  If her publicly revealed preference, 
y* matches the society’s choice, yH, then she will gain the maximum 
reputational utility.  However, as indicated before, an individual’s private 
preference may not match her publicly revealed preference on a given issue.  
Human beings also value their autonomy and self-assertiveness.  The next 
section incorporates this psychological component into the dual preference 
model. 
 
2.3 Expressive  Utility 
 
We exercise our individual autonomy through expressing ourselves.  We 
derive pleasure from revealing our inner thoughts and enjoy being genuine 
about our inner preferences in the public domain to protect our individuality, 
integrity and dignity.  We, human beings, have this need for individual 
autonomy and self-assertiveness, asking for resistance to social pressures.  
Several towering figures in psychology (Freud, Allport, Fromm, and 
Maslow) recognized the need for the individual to express himself and the 
psychic cost the individual incurs when she sacrifices her integrity.  
 
Expressive utility captures the pleasure we derive from being self-
assertive as we do when we speak up our minds and the psychic cost we 
incur when we conform to public pressure.  The more we suppress our inner 
thoughts and beliefs, and yield to social pressures, the greater will be the 
discrepancy between our private and public preferences such that our x* will 
be different from y* as our public preference y* gets closer to society’s 
choice yH. A veiled woman with an Islamist orientation who goes to work in 
a state institution unveiled to keep her job must also compromise her 
expressive utility as she is pressured to behave against her own individual 
preferences in line with Islamic requirements.  Thus, individuals yield to 
public pressure to generate reputational utility at the expense of their 
expressive utility where the difference between their public and private 
preferences and hence, the psychic cost incurred is the greatest. 
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The following function captures this aspect of expressive utility: 
 
E = ε E (100 - |y - x|)   (3) 
 
where (100 - |y - x|) simply determines the proximity of the 
individual’s public preference to her private preference for a given society’s 
choice, yH.  The function E (100 - |y - x|) is assumed to be increasing in 100-
|y - x| and concave over the bounds [0, E(100)].  If her public preference y* 
and her private preference x* are identical, she will have the maximum 
expressive utility from revealing her true self.  The individual specific 
parameter  ε captures how much the individual values her drive for self-
assertiveness in terms of her lifestyle and political orientation.  Being ε > 1, 
the higher ε means that an individual cares more about expressing her own 
views.  Notice that the drive for genuine self-assertiveness varies greatly 
across individuals and ε scales the expressive utility upwards or downwards 
depending on its individual specific value.  The expressive utility is 
maximized when x* = y* such that Ê = ε E (100).  This is the case when 
unveiled women assert their individuality by disregarding the Islamist social 
pressure.  Note also that when the discrepancy between y* and x* is at a 
maximum, then the expressive utility E = ε E(0) = 0 is at a minimum.  As an 
example, a veiled woman compelled to remove her scarf in a university or in 
the parliament must suffer from a complete loss of her expressive utility by 
giving in to the rules of the secular state.  By contrast, she may assert her 
individuality and her worldview by attending such public institutions 
completely veiled. 
 
In every society, there exists a group of individuals with a very high 
value of ε, who sticks to their genuine private preferences at any cost.  For 
them, ε is so high that their expressive utility overrode their reputational 
concerns such that ε E (100) at x* = y* exceeded their maximum 
reputational utility, say, R(y’) where y’ is any public preference different 
from private preference x* but equal to society’s choice yH. I call such 
people as activists who publicly promote their worldviews.  Merve Kavakçı, 
an elected deputy in the 1999 elections, who entered the Turkish Parliament 
wearing a headscarf despite the strict secular dress code, is a case in point.  
Another example is Aziz Nesin, a famous self-declared atheist writer who 
narrowly escaped from burning alive in 1993 when an angry mob arson his 
hotel, resulting in more than 35 deaths.   
 
Ironically, the chameleon majority adamantly admire the self-
assertiveness of the few who resist subordination at any cost.  Yet, such a 
trait is the exception, not the rule in human history.  For this precise reason, 
ε, an individual-specific parameter takes a small value for the most people Choice Under Pressure, 8 
that. I call non-activists.  Therefore, non-activist majority are more likely to 
be susceptible to the social pressures either from activist Islamists or 
secularists.   
 
Thus, the dual preference model presented here depicts a framework 
in which an individual has multiple sources of happiness and the total utility 
of an individual may be represented as the sum of these utilities in the 
following form: 
 
  U (x, y) = I (x) + ρ R (y) + ε E (100- |y - x|).      (4) 
 
3  CHOICE UNDER PRESSURE 
 
Table 1 shows four different cases.  In Cases I and II, no difference between 
public and private preferences exists.  In Cases III and IV, however, private 
preference differs from public preference where the dual preference model 
helps us analyze three distinct responses, i.e., exit, sincere voice, and self-
subversion to opposing group pressures, e.g., Islamists or secularists. 
 
Table 1:  Preferences and Groups 
PREFERENCE             PUBLIC   
 
                
GROUP        
ISLAMIST 




























Also recall that both public and private preferences, x and y, take on a 
value between 0 (extreme Islamist) and 100 (extreme secularist) such that x* 
and y*∈[0, 100] on all social issues regarding these contending worldviews 
and lifestyles. 
 
3.1 Case  I 
 
Case I refers to an Islamist setting in which individuals have public and 
private preferences identical to each other such that x* = y* and x*, y* and 9  Tolga Koker 
yH ∈[0, 50) where 50 represents a neutral position relative to both secularist 
and Islamist worldviews and lifestyles.  yH stands for the society’s choice at 
home. In such a setting, the dual preference model becomes a single 
preference model in which the individual faces no public pressure to express 
a preference different than her own genuine private choice.  For example, a 
devout Muslim woman with a private preference of 15 who prefers to veil 
will experience no public pressure to unveil herself.  On the contrary, the 
public approves her act of veiling as long as society’s preference, yH matches 
y*=15.  This means that in addition to generating a maximum amount of 
intrinsic utility, she will enjoy the greatest reputational benefits such that ρ 
R(15) is at its maximum with y*= yH=15.  Furthermore, the individual will 
experience no emotional strife from being untrue to her inner self and her 
expressive utilities too will be at a maximum.  Thus, her total utility under 
the “ideal” Islamist world is, 
 
Î(15) +ρ R(15)+ε E(100),  (5) 
 
generating the largest utility possible that a practicing Muslim will 
entertain under Case I.  This case also depicts the position of a Muslim living 
in Iran or Saudi Arabia under the Shariat rule or another Muslim society 
with less extreme Islamist policies provided that individuals’ inner 
preferences match those of the society. 
 
3.2 Case  II 
 
The second case refers to a secularist lifestyle in which both public and 
private preferences coincide such that x* = y* and x*, y* and yH ∈(50, 100].  
Since no individual with Islamist preferences exists in this setting, each 
member of society has both secular private and public preferences.  In this 
setting, no woman is willing to or pressured to veil as there exists no Islamic 
lifestyles.  The individuals’ secular private preferences completely match 
those of the society and hence, they can unhesitatingly be true to themselves 
in public.  Case II also yields the largest possible utility for the individual 
with a secular private preference of 80 provided that the society’s 
preference, yH is also 80.  In the absence of social pressures, the individual 
will enjoy the highest reputational utility such that ρ R(80) is at its maximum 
with y*= yH =80.  Furthermore, no psychic cost will also let her to enjoy the 
maximum amount of expressive utility at ε E(100).  Hence, her total utility 
under the “ideal” secular world will be equal to 
 
Î(80) +ρ R(80)+ε E(100),  (6) 
 Choice Under Pressure, 10 
generating the largest utility possible that a secularist will entertain 
under Case II. 
 
In both Case I and Case II, the individual does not face opposing 
group pressures.  However, the crux of this paper is to examine the choice 
under social pressure where individuals continually find themselves in social 
settings, which contradict their genuine private preferences.  Cases III and 
IV specify two such possible settings.  In the coming sections, the dual 
preference model will help formalize three possible responses: exit, sincere 
voice, and self-subversion to the opposing pressure groups.
1 
 
3.3 Case  III 
 
Case III deals with the responses of a practicing Muslim to secular settings.  
In conducting her daily life structured by some principles of secularist 
modernity, a practicing Muslim confronts many obstacles to carrying out the 
duties that Islam demands from her.  Secular principles, norms, and 
behavioral patterns introduced by the state and adopted by the majority in 
the public domain put her in a position in which she has to endure several 
contradictions between her privately held beliefs and behaviors in the public 
sphere.  In deciding whether she has to run her life in accordance with her 
religious beliefs or to fit into a secularist lifestyle, she chooses one of the 




Exit simply means leaving the secular setting.  When she realizes that it is 
impossible to run her life according to Islamic rules under the secular social 
structures, a devout Muslim may desert the secular setting.  Take the 
example of a veiled female student attending a state university that imposes 
a secular dress code with an Islamist private preference of 15 in a secular 
setting with a public preference of 80 where yH=80.  In this setting, neither 
the veiled female student nor the society is extremist.  But the public 
displays a secularist worldview while tolerating some forms of Islamism and 
the veiled female student is holding moderate interpretations of Islam.  If this 
student is unwilling to compromise her position only other option for her to 
get higher education is to migrate to another Islamic country or a pluralistic 
Western European university which protects her individual liberty to veil.  
Let us assume that she transfers to a university in an Islamic country where 
                                                      
1 I was inspired for the first two mechanisms; exit and sincere voice, by Hirschman (1970).  
The last one, self-subversion originates from what Kuran (1995) calls as preference 
falsification.  The term itself comes from Hrischman (1995). 11  Tolga Koker 
society’s stance, yE matches her private preference, x* at 15 such that yE 
stands for the society’s choice abroad (exit case).  In this new setting, she 
will continue to enjoy her maximum intrinsic utility, i.e., Î(15) and the 
highest expressive utility, i.e., ε E(100).  Most importantly, since she reveals 
Islamic preferences in accordance with that of the society at 15 that also 
produces reputational benefits.  Symbolically, one will exit from Case III to 
Case I if her total utility from revealing an identical public and private 
preference of 15 in the foreign country exceeds or is equal to the total utility 
of revealing a public preference in conformity with the society’s choice, 
yH=80 plus the exit cost C such that 
 
Î(15) + ε E(100-|15-15|) + ρ RE(15) ≥ Î(15) + ε E(100-|80-15|) + ρ RH(80) + 
C  
 
ε E(100) + ρ RE(15) ≥  ε E(35) + ρ RH(80) + C  
 
then ε {E(100) – E(35)} ≥  ρ {RH(80) – RE(15)} + C.  (7) 
 
Note that ρ R E(15) is at maximum when she exits to an Islamic setting 
abroad and ρ R H(80) is at maximum when she stays and conforms to the 
society at yH =80. Let us assume that ρ R H(80) = ρ R E(15) for simplicity.  
The above condition becomes ε {E(100) – E(35)} ≥  C. 
 
C captures not only the direct cost of financing the exit but also the 
indirect costs the individual incurs such as loss of jobs, business ties, 
relationships and social network.  Yet, exit may also generate significant 
benefits in the form of a more desirable lifestyle abroad, escaping social 
ostracism and even, danger of losing one’s life, possibly resulting in a 
substantially low cost of exit which should be netted out.  In this case, exit is 
even more viable option because low net cost of exit increases the likelihood 
that the expressive utility exceeds the sum of the reputational gain from 
conformity and the cost of exit.  Therefore, the necessary condition for exit 
is that the individual has the financial means to afford this option (case 
where C is positive but small).  The sufficient condition for exit is that the 
fugitive must have a desirable lifestyle abroad (case where C turns negative). 
Hence, exit option will be chosen by this individual so long as exit cost is 
less than the net expressive utility where C ≤  ε {E(100) – E(35)}. 
 
Alternatively, if her total utility of exit and net of exit costs exceed or 
are equal to her total utility from speaking out against the secular setting 
with yH =80, then 
 
Î(15) + εE(100-|15-15|) + ρ RE(15) ≥ Î(15) + εE(100-|15-15|) + ρ RH(15) + C  Choice Under Pressure, 12 
 
hence, ρ RE(15) ≥ ρ RH(15)+C.   (8) 
 
Note that ρ RH(15) is less than ρ RE(15) at its maximum.  If both of 
these conditions are satisfied, then the individual will exit the secularist 
setting rather than speaking out or conforming.  One of the famous examples 
of exit was Mehmet Akif [Ersoy], an ardent Islamist and the poet of the 
Turkish national anthem.  After the Independence War, he despised the 
Kemalist reforms suppressing Islam.  He left for Egypt during the heyday of 
the Kemalist secularism between 1926 and 1933.  He returned to Turkey in 
1936 before he died a few months later.   
 
However, severe financial constraints and limited options for 
immigration makes exit cost prohibitively high for the majority.  Hence, for 
such an individual with a net exit cost of C such that C >  ε {E(100) – E(35)} 
or  ρ R E(15) < ρ R H(15) + C, sincere voice or self-subversion are other 
possible options. 
 
3.3.2 Sincere Voice 
 
Sincere voice is to express dissatisfaction to secularists by revealing one’s 
Islamist private preferences. As an individual may sincerely voice her 
opposition to a group from which she would like to detach herself.  A female 
doctor may refuse to examine a male patient, since she believes that Islam 
forbids her to touch any male other than husband or close kin.  A veiled 
student may join pro-veiling protests, demanding the right to veil on campus. 
 
The individual will resist the secularist pressures if her total utility 
from sincere voice in which she reveals an identical public and private 
preference of 15, exceeds the total utility of revealing a public preference in 
conformity with the society’s secularist setting at 80.  Symbolically, the 
condition for sincere voice in such a secular setting is,  
 
Î(15) + ε E(100-|15- 15|) + ρ R(15) ≥  Î(15) + ε E(100-|80- 15|) + ρ R(80)  
 
ε {E(100) – E(35)} ≥ ρ {R(80)- R(15)}.  (9) 
  
Given that ρ RE(15) < ρ RH(15) + C such that sincere voice is also preferred 
to exit and the condition for sincere voice is satisfied when the sum of the 
net expressive utility from self-assertiveness and the net intrinsic utility from 
being true to oneself is large enough to exceed the net reputational utility 
from conformity and when the total utility of sincere voice exceeds the total 
utility of exit. 13  Tolga Koker 
 
The option of sincere voice covers both the Islamist activists and the 
non-activists with the large enough expressive utilities to override 
reputational concerns in a secular setting.  But among those who engage in 
sincere voice, the Islamist activists will fight forcefully against secularist 
pressures while attempting to exert some pressures on non-activist 
individuals to join them.  These activists have relatively large individual 
specific parameter ε, which increases the intensity of their desire to defend 
their private preferences to the point of imposing their own worldview on 
others while lambasting the secular setting.  Jubilantly cherishing their 
integrity, intellectuals have large ε values corresponding to higher expressive 
utility.  Indeed, many Islamist intellectuals bash secularist pressures by 
writing articles, making public speeches, organizing protest meetings.  Necip 
Fazıl Kısakürek, Cemil Meriç and İsmet Özel are among such intellectuals.  
 
3.3.3 Pro-secularist Self-Subversion 
 
Pro-secularist self-subversion occurs when a religious person hides 
her Islamic preferences and publicly conveys a secularist preference in 
response to secularist pressures.  In other words, pro-secularist self-
subversion is an act of misrepresenting one’s genuine religious beliefs under 
the secularist pressures.  This is a legitimate option within Islam.  The Shi’ite 
doctrine of taqiya  allows devout Muslims to dissimulate their religious 
orientations by hiding their particular religious rites and ritual practices.  For 
example, a veiled female student may choose to take off her scarf in order to 
get admitted to a Turkish university, which imposes a secular dress code.   
 
The condition for pro-secularist self-subversion is satisfied when a 
female with an Islamist private preference of 15 and a desire to veil takes off 
her scarf in public in conformity with the secular public setting of 80 to 
generate reputational gains.  Symbolically, the condition for this case 
follows; 
 
Î(15) + ε E(100-|15-15|) + ρ R(15) <  Î(15) + ε E(100-|80-15|) + ρ R(80) 
 
then ε {E(100) – E(35)} < ρ {R(80) – R(15)}   (10) 
 
such that conformity in the form of self-subversion is preferred to sincere 
voice and it is also preferred to exit when ε {E(100) – E(35)} < C. 
 
Each ordinary person easily senses that her opinion will have no effect 
upon the secularist majority since she is only one among many.  Rather than 
going against secularist groups, she may enjoy their approval by pretending Choice Under Pressure, 14 
to be secular at the cost of being untrue to herself.  Obviously, she values 
reputational rewards more highly than her integrity.  This is the case for the 
majority in Turkey. 
 
Note that under Case III, considering all three possible choices, (i.e., 
exit, sincere voice and pro-secularist self-subversion) simultaneously, the 
individual will choose the option that maximizes her utility.   
 
3.4 Case IV 
 
Case IV frames the responses of a secular citizen to Islamist settings.  In 
conducting her daily life within a Muslim culture, a secular citizen has a 
difficult time in avoiding the Islamist pressures.  Many Islamist social norms 
and behavioral patterns oblige her to withstand several contradictions.  She 
is continually caught between running her life in accordance with secularist 
quests and fitting into Muslim culture.  She again has the same three options.  
A secular citizen will choose an option that produces for her the highest total 




Exit is to leave the Islamist setting.  An atheist who can not endure 
pressures from the Muslim community may settle in a predominantly non-
Muslim country.  Take an example from the daily life of an ordinary female 
with a secularist orientation at 80 living in an Islamist setting in Saudi 
Arabia with a public’s preference of 10.  She may value her secularist 
lifestyle which offers her individual liberties such as unveiling and driving a 
car without a male present in the car much more than conforming to the 
Islamist worldview which pressures her to veil and suppresses her freedom 
of action.  This female with the financial means and opportunities to make a 
living abroad can choose to exit from Case IV to Case II if her total utility 
from revealing an identical public and private preference of 80 net of exit 
cost C exceeds the total utility of revealing a public preference in conformity 
with the society’s preference yH at 10 such that 
 
Î(80) + εE(100-|80-80|) + ρ RE(80) ≥  Î(80) + εE(100-|10-80|) + ρ RH(10) + 
C 
 
ε E(100) + ρ RE(80) ≥ ε E(30) + ρ RH(10) + C 
 
then ε {E(100) – E(30)} ≥ ρ {RH(10) – RE(80)} + C.   (11) 
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Again, when we impose that ρ RH(10) = ρ RE(80), we can rewrite this 
condition as ε {E(100) – E(30)} ≥ C.  Hence, exit is preferred to conformity 
given this condition.  But for exit to be a preferred course of action, her total 
utility under exit should also be greater than her utility from sincere voice.  
Thus, individual will choose to exit over sincere voice given the following 
condition: 
 
Î(80) + εE(100-|80-80|) + ρ RE(80) ≥ Î(80) + εE(100-|80-80|) + ρ RH(80) + 
C,  
 
thus ρ RE(80) ≥ ρ RH(80) + C.   (12) 
 
Note that RH(80) is less than the maximum value of ρ RE(80).  If (11) 
and (12) are satisfied, then the individual will exit the Islamist setting rather 
than speaking out or conforming. 
 
The stricter the penalties on the individual with available means, the 
more likely an individual will exit as its cost turns negative.  For example, 
Niyazi Berkes, a pro-secularist scholar, after being beaten by pro-Islamist 
activists, left Turkey in 1949 for Canada, where he was able to resume his 
career.  İlhan Arsel, a self-declared atheist and anti-religious professor of the 
Ankara School of Law, also decided to live in the United States as a result of 
several death threats from radical Islamists in Turkey.
2  Another 
academician, critical of Islamic economics, received several death threats 
after a newspaper had popularized his research.  He had to withdraw his 
article from publication in a prestigious Middle Eastern journal.  He resigned 
from his tenured position at a Turkish University and resumed his career in 
the United States.
3  For them, cost of exit must have turned negative as he 
escaped to another country to save his life or the benefits of exit more than 
compensated for the direct and indirect costs of exit.   
 
Yet, the majority has no available means to successfully exit.  Hence, 
for such an individual with large exit costs such that C> ε {E(100) – E(30)} 
or RE(80)< RH(80) + C, sincere voice or self-subversion remains as a 





                                                      
2 For his anti-Islamic writings see Arsel (1977 and 1995). 
3 Personal correspondence, 15 October 1999.  I keep his name secret to protect his privacy. Choice Under Pressure, 16 
3.4.2 Sincere  Voice 
 
Sincere voice is the expression of dissatisfaction with the Islamist setting by 
declaring secular private preferences. A high school student may protest 
against the Ministry of National Education that compels her to take a 
religion course each year.  A hotel owner will speak out against Islamists 
who want to close topless beaches to avoid losing customers who enjoy 
topless sunbathing.  The sincere voice option is the case for an individual 
who refuses to compromise her private preference at 80 in an Islamist setting 
which rewards her public preference at a maximum if it matches the 
society’s setting, yH at 10 such that R(10) represents the maximum amount 
of reputational gains under the Islamic setting.  The condition for sincere 
voice in an Islamist setting emerges when the individual’s total utility under 
sincere voice exceeds her total utility from conforming to the Islamic setting.  
This can be symbolically written as:  
 
Î(80) + ε E(100-|80- 80|) + ρ R(80) ≥ Î(80) + ε E(100-|10-80|) + ρ R(10) 
 
then ε {E(100) - E(30)}≥ ρ {R(10) - R(80)}   (13) 
 
and sincere voice is preferred to conformity, and if ρ RE(80)< ρ RH(80) + C 
is satisfied sincere voice is also preferred to exit. 
 
Secularist activists whose expressive satisfaction surpasses the 
Islamist reputational benefits will, for example, lambast all Islamists.   
Among those who could afford the exit option, some activist individuals 
with a large ε may choose to fight against the Islamist worldview to protect 
their autonomy and those of the non-activists with a secularist orientation.  
Sincerely speaking up in public can be costly for an individual and might 
even be fatal.  For instance, Bahriye Üçok, Muhammer Aksoy, Uğur 
Mumcu, Çetin Emeç, and Turan Dursun, all five strongly secularist 
intellectuals, were probably assassinated by illegal radical Islamist 
organizations.  The case of Turan Dursun was the most striking example.  
Dursun himself was once an esteemed mufti, the highest rank for a provincial 
imam.  When he turned into a self-declared atheist, he publicly condemned 
the Islamist worldview.  “I do not want to be squeezed between what I live 
and what I think,” (36) said Dursun (1992) in one of his late interviews.  He 
resigned from his religious post and wrote several books through which he 
attacked the original texts of Islam.  He was one of the most outspoken 
secularist and anti-Islamist before he was assassinated in 1990.   
 
Although the cases above are extreme, voice may still bring some 
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losing their old business ties, relationships and the social network within 
which they have lived for years.  In addition, they may be fearful of possible 
social ostracism.  Hence, most people are more likely to engage in pro-
Islamist self-subversion. 
 
3.4.3 Pro-Islamist  Self-Subversion 
 
If one has private preferences supportive of the secularist worldview, but she 
misrepresents these preferences under Islamist pressures, she engages in pro-
Islamist self-subversion.  For example, a shopkeeper who decorates his shop 
with religious symbols falsifies his secular private preferences so as not to be 
stigmatized as anti-religious; a newcomer to a city who behaves as if he is a 
devout Muslim to find a job; a student who pretends to practice Islam to stay 
in a dormitory funded by the Islamists – all succumb to Islamic pressures are 
falsifying their preferences.   
 
The condition for pro-Islamist self-subversion is that the reputational 
benefits from behaving as a devout Muslim override one’s expressive needs 
to be secular.  Symbolically, the condition for pro-Islamist self-subversion is  
 
Î(80) + ε E(100-|80- 80|) + ρ RH(80) < Î(80) + ε E(100-|10-80|) + ρ R(10) 
 
then ε {E(100) - E(30)}< ρ {R(10) - R(80)}   (14) 
 
such that self-subversion is preferred to sincere voice and recall that it is also 
preferred to exit when ε {E(100) – E(30)} < C. 
 
For many, this appears to be the case.  These individuals perceive that 
their opinion will have no influence upon the setting.  Rather than standing 
up the Islamists, one may enjoy their social approval by pretending to be a 
pious Muslim at the cost of being untrue to herself.  To illustrate, after years 
of being exposed to secularist ideas during her education in secular schools, 
a young female student might believe that Islam has no respect for woman’s 
rights and might object to the practice of veiling.  Yet, she may feel obliged 
to wear a headscarf when vacationing in her conservative hometown, fearing 
her relatives criticize her for disregarding the Islamic dress code. 
 
3.5  Tying It All Together 
 
The following figure summarizes all the possible responses to the collision 
of Islamism and secularism in Turkey.   
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  CASE     CASE III   CASE IV  CASE II 
         
 
           Stay 
  
  Exit       Exit 
(to Case I)       (to  Case  II) 
 
          
    Sincere   
     V o i c e  
 
  Pro-secularist    Pro-Islamist  
  Self-Subversion    Self-Subversion   
   
 
Figure 1: Decision Tree 
 
As any individual enters into a new setting she readily observes its 
general characteristics on its pro-secularist or pro-Islamist orientation.  She 
will notice the others’ outfits, especially any religious or secularist symbols.  
Veiled women, men with silver wedding rings, with distinctive beard styles, 
or long rosaries are the common signals of Islamist settings.  In contrast, 
presence of M. Kemal Atatürk in the form of pictures, rosettes, or statue 
generally signals a strong pro-secularist orientation.  Certain words also give 
clues about Islamist or secularist tendencies.  If the individual’s private 
preference coincides with the setting, then she will have no difficulty in 
expressing her own preference on the several controversial issues to the 
others.  In cases where her private preference differs from the others’ public 
preferences she will immediately sense that she will face social pressures 
that will produce a reputational loss.  In short, any individual in Turkey 
inevitably finds herself either in Case III or Case IV, which leaves 
individuals with two options: to stay or to move to a setting that matches her 
private preferences.  A devout Muslim may immigrate to another country 
where she may conduct her life in accordance with Islamic rules.  A secular 
individual may settle in a country where she can avoid Islamist pressures.   
 
Since the exit option is beyond the financial capabilities of many, 
most individuals would stay.  Such individuals have two options:  First, she 
may not hesitate to reveal her private preference despite the social 
oppositional pressures, and freely speak up her mind.  Said-i Nursi criticized 
secular reforms in Turkey, even though he spent several years in jail.  Turan 
Dursun has written many anti-Islamic books before his assassination in 19  Tolga Koker 
1990.  Thus, sincere voice also involve huge costs.  Second, the individual 
may engage in self-subversion by adapting herself to the social milieu.  In 
order to avoid reputational losses, individuals are likely to engage in pro-
Islamist or pro-secularist self-subversion, as the least costly option in 
response to the collision of Islamism and secularism in Turkey.  
 
3.6 Taking  a  Side 
 
Islamists and secularists constitute two competing pressure groups in 
Turkey.  Each camp has an inner core of activists with an outer ring of non-
activists.  By definition, activists do not mind revealing their private 
preferences in public, deliberately propagating their views in order to win 
mass support for their particular worldview.  Regardless of the social setting, 
a secularist activist will always support her right to consume alcohol and an 
Islamist female activist will always refuse to unveil herself.  In non-activists’ 
support for their cause, Islamists want more women veiled in the public 
sphere while secularists demand fewer Islamist symbols.  The resulting 
collectivity, including activists as well as non-activists professing support for 
a specific cause, forms a pressure group.   
 
The Islamist pressure group is composed of the ardent supporters of 
Islamism and other practicing Muslims, including the members of the 
Islamist parties, Nakşibendi religious orders, Islamist Nurcu community and 
veiled students, all vacuously revealing their Islamist preferences in public.  
Likewise, the secularist pressure group includes the ardent supporters of 
secularism such as the members of the Society for Atatürkist Thought 
(Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) and the Society to Support Modern Life Style 
(Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği).  In order to succeed in their common 
goal, like-minded activists seek support of non-activists.  The activists enjoy 
more power as they increase the number of non-activists supporting their 
own cause.  More veiled women in the public sphere indicate greater 
Islamization.  More protestors against Islamist policies signal the power of 
the secularist establishment.  For this reason, the pressure groups offer 
substantial benefits to their supporters while imposing considerable penalties 
on their challengers.  As a result, the prevailing reputational incentives play 
a crucial role in determining non-activists’ public preferences.   
 
In a polarized political environment where two pressure groups like 
Islamists and secularists routinely push non-activists to take a side it is 
extremely difficult for each non-activist to place herself in a neutral position.  
The non-activist individual will notice that staying on neutral grounds leads 
to an isolation from both groups, and prevents her from getting potential 
benefits, and leaves her vulnerable to reputational loss.  Given her weak Choice Under Pressure, 20 
expressive needs, an non-activist will incline to one side, depending on her 
proximity to the pressure group.  A new bride will veil herself to get along 
with her husband’s conservative family even if she dislikes Islamist dress.  A 
female freshman will take her veil off when she enrolls into a college.  One 
way or another, each non-activist tries to fit into her social setting. 
 
3.7  Public Opinion versus Private Opinion 
 
Not all public differences will have the same effect in forming public 
opinion on a specific issue.  A public statement of a religious leader or an 
army general on the veil will probably have a greater impact than the similar 
declaration by a non-activist.  To keep the model simple, let us ignore the 
differences in personal influence and treat each individual’s impact as the 
same and investigate the distribution of public and private preferences.    
 
Figure 2:  Polarized Public Opinion 
Source:  Adopted from Kuran (1995; 57, figure 3.1) 
 
In the absence of any pro-secularist and pro-Islamist self-subversion, 
each individual will place herself somewhere between the spectrum of 0 
(i.e., complete Islamization) and 100 (i.e., complete secularization).  The 
very existence of self-subversion makes impossible to know the exact 
distribution of private preferences along this spectrum.  Yet, it is reasonable 
to assume that many moderate views in the Turkish society with many 
different interpretations of Islam and secularism along the range of [0, 100].  
Moderates may form the majority and the distribution of private preferences 
would surface as a normal distribution.  Even though the normal distribution 21  Tolga Koker 
would be the closest proximity to the reality, let us assume that private 
preferences are more or less evenly distributed.  Let X be the arithmetic 
mean of all private preferences.  Figure 2 shows the uniform distribution of 
private preferences between 0 and 100.  Note that X appears as 50.  
 
The distribution of public preferences, on the other hand, will depend 
on the reputational incentives.  As explained before, each individual, one 
way or another, must pick a side between two oppositional pressure groups, 
namely Islamists and secularists on the issue of veiling and among many 
others.  The percentage of the population supporting a particular side will 
vary according to relative strength of one group over the other.  Depending 
on the pressure group’s control over the public sphere, the number of its 
supporters will increase.  Let Y be the corresponding arithmetic mean of all 
public preferences.  Also assume that secularists offer more reputational 
benefits.  It is expected that non-activists will publicly support secularist 
causes such as unveiling of the women in the public sphere.  Figure 2 shows 
that 70 percent of the population supports an extreme secularist position at 
100, and hence unveiling of all women in all public settings while the 
remaining 30 percent favor extreme Islamism at 0, and hence veiling. 
 
The distributions of private and public preferences accordingly form 
private and public opinion.  It will be easy to see that reputational concerns 
lead to a polarized public opinion even if private opinion is not polarized.  In 
this scenario, while private opinion remains hidden, each pressure group will 
push harder for a favorable public opinion closer to their ultimate position.  
For this reason, Islamists will offer more reputational benefits for their 
supporters while imposing more costs on their adversaries.  Secularist will 




In the battle over public opinion, both Islamists and secularists intend to 
increase the number of the non-activists professing support for their cause as 
in the context of veiling issue.  Islamists attempt to raise the number of 
veiled women in the public sphere by offering benefits to those women who 
are veiled and by imposing costs on those who are not.  On the other hand, 
secularists reward unveiled women in the public spheres and try to keep the 
number of unveiled women as high as possible. The veiled women will face 
clear reputational losses from secularists.   
 
A female non-activist has a fixed private preference.  This means that 
she decides based on the nature of her relationship with God.  Accordingly, 
she drives an intrinsic utility, which is also fixed at Î.  As a single member of Choice Under Pressure, 22 
Turkish society, she has a trivial ability to influence the collective decisions 
on Islamism and Turkish secularism.  When she steps into the public sphere, 
assuming her intrinsic utility to be negligibly small, her decision to convey a 
religious private preference will depend on the tradeoff between her 
expressive needs and the reputational incentives.  Given that it is impractical 
for her to exit the Turkish public sphere, she has to take a side between 0 i.e., 
extreme Islamists and 100 i.e., extreme secularists.  Her reputational utility 
depends on favorable public opinion, more precisely the mean of the public 
opinion,  Y which is calculated as (0.30*0+0.70*100)=70 as in Figure 2.   
Suppose her private declaration x* is close to 0, i.e., Islamists.  However, the 
public opinion Y at 70 is very favorable to 100, i.e., secularists.  Under this 
case, at one point she would better off supporting secularism by unveiling 
herself due to her reputational gains.  The switchover point refers to her 




Figure 3:  The individual’s Political Threshold 
Source:  Adopted from Kuran (1995: 64, figure 4.1) 
 
She will support secularism if the mean of the public opinion is greater than 
her threshold, i.e., Y > t=50.  Otherwise, if the mean of the public opinion is 
less than her threshold, i.e., Y < t=50, she would support Islamism. 
 
It is very reasonable to expect that there are a variety of private 
preferences between Islamism and secularism as well as between veiling and 
unveiling among the Turkish people.  Also, political thresholds vary across 
individuals stemming from different personality characteristics.  Thus, there 
can be a variety of different distributions of thresholds among the public, and 
hence different cumulative distributions of thresholds.  Plotting a cumulative 
distribution of thresholds for each Y between 0, i.e., Islamism (veiling) and 
100, i.e., secularism (unveiling), gives a curve that shows the propagation of 
self-subversion.  In short, Kuran calls such curves propagation curves.  Each 
member of the Turkish society will form some expectations about the future 
mean public opinion on the issue of veiling as a result of the interplay of 
Islamism and secularism in the Turkish society.  Let Y
e be the expected 
public opinion which is same for everyone; the prevailing propagation curve 
will result in a realization of public opinion.   
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In Figure 4, the expected public opinion between Islamism (veiling) 
and secularism (unveiling) is situated on the horizontal lower axis Y
e and the 
realization of public opinion is placed on the left vertical axis Y.  Figure 4 
depicts the position of propagation curve with respect to Y
e and Y.  Figure 4 
also entails 45˚ line that displays all possible equilibrium points where Y
e = 
Y.  Suppose that expected public opinion is at 50 where the individual is at 
an equal distance from both Islamism and secularism.  The propagation 
curve shows that 55 percent of the population with a threshold at or below 
50 supports 100, i.e., secularism and the remaining 45 percent gives its 
public support to 0, i.e., Islamism.  This means that an expectation of 50 
yields public opinion of 55 in favor of secularism.  Yet, this underestimated 
initial expectation of 50 will soon be revised and any expectation below 90 
will generate further revision until the expected public opinion will be self-
fulfilling and self-reproducing at 90.  A unique equilibrium will occur where 
the propagation curve intersects the 45˚ line (the diagonal) where the 
expected public opinion is simply realized at 90, i.e., Y
e = Y = 90.  At this 
point, there exists a single self-fulfilling expectation.  In other words, the 
actual public opinion will match individuals’ expectations only when they 
are correct in predicting where the actual public opinion stands on the issue 
of veiling.   
 
Note that in Figure 4, 10 percent of the population has a political 
threshold of 0 such that for any public opinion greater than 0, Y>t=0, these 
individuals will support secularism.  I call these people hardcore secularists, 
or secularist activists. On the other hand, 5 percent of the population has a 
political threshold of 100 such that for any public opinion up to 100, these 
individuals will support Islamism.  I call these people hardcore Islamists, or 
Islamist activists.  The remaining 85 percent of the population are non –
activists with thresholds between 0 and 100 that may lean towards either 
side, depending upon the strength of the pressure groups, and the stance of 
public opinion.  The threshold of an individual which we take as 50 may 
change due to several factors: Holding all else constant, a rise in his private 
preference, say from x*=30 to 40 towards secularism, will reduce the 
expressive disadvantage to supporting secularism, thus lowering the 
threshold. Similarly, if the secularist pressure group becomes more effective 
in exerting a social impact on nonactivists, then the reputational benefits of 
supporting secularism for the individual increases, which reduces her 
threshold.  An increase in expressive needs as captured by ε, however, will 
increase the threshold of the individual, making it less likely to support 
secularism if her private preference differs from this public preference. 
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  Figure 4:  The Propagation Curve with an Interior Equilibrium 
Source:  Adopted from Kuran (1995: 64, figure 4.3) 
 
The propagation curve in Figure 4 will clearly shift down when the 
share of hardcore secularists declines while the share of hardcore Islamists 
increases, leading to a new interior equilibrium lower than 90.  The curve 
will shift up when the share of secularist core goes up while the share of 
Islamist core goes down, increasing the interior equilibrium beyond 90.  As I 
explained elsewhere (Self-Reference, 2005), this refers to the heydays of 
Kemalist secularism in Turkey in the mid-1930s, the secularist core was able 
to exert immense pressures on the non-activists, raising the reputational 
benefits from joining the bandwagon of secularism.  Consequently, the 
public opinion shifted increasingly towards support for complete 
secularization.  Not only secularists were increasing in numbers, and as a 
share of the population but also their social impact as a group, were at a 
maximum.  Panel B of the Figure 4 depicts the topographic metaphor, a 
valley with a lowest point at 90.  A ball placed anywhere in this valley 
metaphorically shows movements of public opinion.  It will roll towards the 
nadir at 90 and will remain at rest indefinitely, i.e., equilibrium point.  Note 
that this single equilibrium point in Figure 4 lies inside the spectrum of 
possible expectations.  So, it constitutes an interior equilibrium.  It clearly 
states that 90 percent of the population overtly support secularism and 25  Tolga Koker 
advocate complete unveiling of all women in the public sphere while only 10 
percent support Islamism and publicly advocate complete Islamization, 
including veiling of all women.  In the battle over public opinion, this 
equilibrium is not sufficient enough to serve the ultimate aim of either 
Islamists or secularists.   
 
 
  Figure 5:  Corner Equilibrium 
Source:  Adopted from Kuran (1995: 68, figure 4.4) 
 
Both pressure groups work to shift this equilibrium to a new one at 
which all the individuals publicly support the group’s position.  Islamists 
work for complete Islamization and veiling while secularists go for complete 
secularization and unveiling.  Complete Islamization calls for an equilibrium 
at 0 whereas complete secularization for an equilibrium at 100.  An 
equilibrium that may occur at either extreme refers to a corner equilibrium 
where the threshold curve meets the diagonal at 0 or 100.  Figure 5 illustrates 
one possible corner equilibrium where any expectation below 100 will 
produce self-corrections leading to a self-fulfilling and self-producing 
equilibrium at the upper left corner for the secularist position.   
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A corner equilibrium indicates the demise of one core of activists.  In 
the context of Turkey, complete secularization means the disappearance of 
Islamism and all veiled women from the public sphere and complete 
Islamization calls for the suppression of secularism and unveiled women. 
Either case will appear as a near-corner equilibrium where only a few 
activists remain in the opposition.  I will discuss such possibilities after 
examining the consequences of widespread self-subversion.  
 
5. MULTIPLE  EQUILIBRIA 
 
Self-subversion may lead to multiple equilibria, indicating a polarized public 
opinion between two activists groups: for the Turkish case, secularists versus 
Islamists and leaving the majority wavering in between.  There are several 
examples from Turkish political scene on this battle to influence the public 
and win support for either of these worldviews for purpose of their ultimate 
goals.  The unwavering confrontation between Islamists and secularists 
divided the public opinion leading to dichotomous expectations among the 
masses with respect to the two camps.  It is time to show how the Islamists 
and the secularists attempt to use social pressures to their advantage resulted 
in multiple societal equilibria in Turkey. 
 
Assume that there exists a secularist core with a share of 15 percent 
and an Islamist core with a 10 percent share in the population, each trying to 
tilt the balance of political power to their side.  They would keep trying to 
drive each other’s worldview out of the public realm by forcing non-activist 
majority to take sides.  Such polarization may entail multiple equilibria: one 
unstable and two stable equilibria.  The two stable equilibria, generated at YA 
=20 and YC =80, refer to the opposing positions of Islamists and secularists 
respectively, each insisting on its position with little or no compromise.   
Islamist equilibrium occurs at 20, where activist Islamists permits only 
certain women to unveil such as foreign females and female tourists in 
Turkey.  The secularist equilibrium exists at 80, where secularist activists 
only permit veiling at the religious Imam-Hatip schools.  The unstable 
equilibrium at YB  =70 implies that even the smallest gains in terms of 
pressure group efficiency may lead to different expectations that can 
generate adjustments towards one of the stable equilibria in both directions.  
This may be taken to represent the current situation in Turkey with 70 
percent in favor of the secularists and 30 percent in favor of the Islamists 
who want to see a more Islamized Turkey.  Figure 6 represents such an 
unstable equilibrium at B.   
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  Figure 6: Multiple Equilibria 
  Source:  Adopted from Kuran (1995: 70, figure 4.5) 
 
In panel B of Figure 6 there exist two stable interior equilibria: one at 
20 i.e., the Islamist equilibrium and the other at 80, i.e., the secularist 
equilibrium.  The existing unstable equilibrium appears at 70 as a hilltop.  
The ball on the hilltop may eventually move towards either more 
Islamization (denoted here as 20) or towards more secularization (80) to 
achieve a single stable equilibrium.  The clash between two activist groups 
puts the majority of people in the middle.  Because of the pressures from 
activists, the wavering non-activist majority continually engages in extensive 
self-subversion.  Among Islamists, a non-activist bystander will often engage 
in pro-Islamist self-subversion.  Among secularists, he will engage in pro-
secularist self-subversion.  The next section documents the widespread 
existence of self-subversion in Turkey based on the two field experiments, 
capturing the existing status quo, i.e., multiple societal equilibria. 
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5.1  The Polarized Public Opinion in Turkey 
 
In December 24, 1995 elections, for the first time in the history of the 
Turkish Republic, an openly Islamist party emerged as the leading political 
institution.  Following the elections, the coalition between the openly 
Islamist Welfare Party (WP) and the True Path party (TPP), with the WP as 
the senior partner, obtained a vote of confidence from the newly elected 
parliament. It was shocking for the secularist establishment to see Necmettin 
Erbakan, the WP’s leader, as the first Islamist Premier of the Turkish 
Republic established on the founding principle of secularism.  In response to 
the new government’s Islamization policies, the secularist establishment was 
quick at organizing a full counterattack under the leadership of the Turkish 
military, self-proclaimed guardian of Kemalist secularism.   
 
The counterattack reached at its zenith at the National Security 
Council’s (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) meeting on February 28, 1998.
4  After 
suppressing all the Islamists within National Security Council (NSC), the 
Turkish military led the so-called post-modern (soft) coup known as 
“February 28 process” through which the secularists initiated detailed 
measures, aiming directly to purge Islamists from the public sphere.  The 18 
Directives of the February 28 ranged from general recommendations such as 
the request to meticulously preserve the principle of secularism to very 
specific ones like the strict implementation of the prohibition of wearing 
religious grab in public.
5  Some “19 newspapers, 20 television stations, 51 
radio stations, 110 magazines, 800 schools, 1,200 student hostels, and 2,500 
associations”
6 were marked as a part of “fundamentalist” threat to Turkish 
secularism.  The secularist establishment urged the other civil society 
organizations such as women’s associations, trade and business unions “to 
oppose the sharing of public spaces with the merging Islamic identity and 
lifestyle.”
7 Facing extreme secularist pressures, Islamist Premier Erbakan 
first reluctantly approved the February 28 package and five months later in 
June 1997 resigned from his post.  Another coalition of secularly oriented 
parties soon came to power.  In an aura of witch hunt for Islamists, on 
                                                      
4 The NSC includes the president, the premier, the ministers of interior, foreign affairs and 
defense, the chief of the general staff, the commanders of the army, the navy, the air force, the 
gendarme forces and the secretary-general of the NSC (a high-ranking army officer).  Since 
its decisions are constitutionally binding, it enables the military to monitor the affairs of 
government and intervene in the democratic process if deemed necessary.  After a three-day 
delay the Islamist Premier Erbakan also signed this package.  The Islamist Erbakan himself 
engaged in pro-secularist self-subversion. 
5 For a full list of all the 18 Directives in English, see Appendix in Yavuz, (2003). 
6 Şevket Kazan, (2001) quoted in M. Hakan Yavuz (2003). 
7 Yavuz (2003:245). 29  Tolga Koker 
January 1998 the following experiment was conducted to determine the 
revealed preferences of the Turkish people on Islamism and secularism. 
 
A pair of interviewers (a male and a female) carried out interviews in 
sets of three (50 participants in each case) administering them identically, 
except for the type of the accessories used by the interviewers.  In one 
condition the interviewers carried widely known Islamic symbols.  The male 
interviewer had a silver engagement ring while the female interviewer was 
veiled.  In another condition both interviewers carried Kemalist and anti-
religious symbols: a button of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on each one’s jacket.  
Lastly, in the neutral interview, the interviewers had no symbols at all.
8  The 
target sample size of 150 respondents was drawn from the population of 
İzmir, Ankara and İstanbul with quotas based on location.  The locations 
selected in each city were the centers of the cities around which the possible 
participants constituted a good representation of the population.  In each 
location respondents were picked in accordance with stratified sampling i.e., 
every third person that passed a previously marked point.  The single 
independent variable, type of outfit, had three levels, secularist, neutral and 
Islamist.  The dependent measures were as follows:  Authority, dependence, 
religiosity, Islamic piety, and secularity. 
 
An English translation of the designated questionnaire appears in 
Appendix A.  It contained two sets of items.  The first set includes standard 
background questions regarding age, sex, place of origin (i.e., the type of 
environment in which the respondent was raised such as metropolitan, 
provincial city, town or village), occupation, education and monthly 
household income.  The second set included seven Likert-scaled items to 
determine five attributes:  authority, dependence, and religiosity, Islamic 
piety and secularity.  The first two items were designed as the indicators of 
authoritarianism; the third as the indicator of dependence; the fourth and 
fifth as the indicators of religiosity, the sixth as the indicator of Islamic piety, 
and the last one as the indicator of secularity.
9  The procedure of the 1998, 
2004 and 2008 was identical to each other.   
 
First I have checked whether the respondents correctly identified the 
Islamist and secularist symbols and recognized the neutral condition.   
                                                      
8 The interviewers did not make any claims about their personal preferences.  It was up to 
respondents to draw inferences from the appearance of the interviewers.  It was impossible to 
make the interviewers blind to experimental conditions.  For this reason, the trained 
interviewers carried out a rigorous experiment in a nonpartisan manner.   The male 
interviewer asked the questions in Turkish while the female one recorded the answers. 
9 The first five questions out of seven were the same questions Bianchi used in his 1973 
questionnaire in Turkey.  Robert Bianchi (1984). Choice Under Pressure, 30 
Manipulation check showed that participants perceived the interviewers in 
each condition as intended in all the 1998, 2004 and 2008 experiments.  In 
order to ensure that respondents in the three conditions were quite identical 
with regard to major background factors, the three experimental conditions 
against place of origin, occupation, education and income, as well as age and 
sex were cross tabulated.  No statistical difference among the groups was 
found in all the three experiments.   
 
The seven items in the second part of the questionnaire help us to 
determine participants’ revealed preferences under perceived social pressure 
about authoritarianism, dependence, religiosity, Islamic piety and secularity.  
The first two items labeled as Authority I and Authority II, respectively, 
were taken as the indicators of authoritarianism.  Similarly, the third item 
was labeled as Dependence and taken as the indicator of dependence.  The 
fourth and fifth named as Religiosity I and Religiosity II, respectively, were 
the indicators of religiosity.  Religiosity I inquired about participants’ level 
of personal attitudes towards religion while Religiosity II measured 
participants’ level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force.  The sixth, 
called here Islamic piety, aimed at how participants identified themselves in 
each experimental condition, while the seventh item referred to below as 
Secularity determines participants’ revealed preferences towards secularism. 
 
Table 2 shows the responses in the 1998 experiment that produced the 
key results on whether the experimental conditions i.e., the type of the 
accessories used by the interviewers, had a significant effect on participants’ 
responses with regard to authority, dependence, religiosity, Islamic piety and 
secularity.  The results indicated that the experimental condition i.e., the 
manipulation of the interviewers’ outfits produced a significant effect on 
participants’ revealed preferences about religiosity, Islamic piety and 
secularity while the outfits had no significant effect on authority and 
dependence.
10   
                                                      
10 The level of Islamic piety differed as a function of type of outfit, F(2, 148) = 3.10, p < .05.  
According to Tukey-a test, participants’ level of Islamic piety was lower under the secularist 
and neutral conditions than under the Islamist condition (p < .05).  The effect of outfit type on 
Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity yielded more statistically significant results at the 
alpha level of p < .0001.  Specifically, for Religiosity I, the type of outfit led to significant 
difference, F (2,147) = 11.13, p < .0001.  Tukey a tests also showed that participants' level of 
personal religiosity decreased under the secular and neutral conditions than under the Islamist 
condition (p < .05).  For Religiosity II, an ANOVA indicated that the type of outfit again was 
significant, F (2,144) = 14.28, p < .0001. The level of endorsing religion as a social stabilizing 
factor increased under the Islamist condition than under the neutral and secularist conditions 
(p < .05).  The level of secularity also differed as a function of outfit type, F (2,146) = 
15.84, p < .0001.  Participants’ level of secularity rose higher under the neutral and secularist 
conditions than under the Islamist condition (p < .05).  31  Tolga Koker 
Table 2: Authority, Dependence, Religiosity, Islamic Piety and Secularity as a Function of 







1.  AUTHORITY I      
M 1.98  2.04  2.10 
SD 0.38  0.67  0.54 
n 50  50  50 
2.  AUTHORITY II      
M 2.65  2.64  2.74 
SD 0.56  0.63  0.60 
n 49  50  50 
3.  DEPENDENCE      
M 1.94  2.04  1.92 
SD 0.59  0.49  0.70 
n 49  50  50 
4.   RELIGIOSITY I      
M 2.61a 2.04b 2.16b 
SD 0.67  0.60  0.62 
n 49  50  49 
5.  RELIGIOSITY II      
M 1.87a 2.41b 2.49b 
SD 0.61  0.64  0.58 
n 47  50  49 
6.  DEVOTED MUSLIM      
M 1.86a 2.10b 2.12b 
SD 0.58  0.58  0.59 
n 49  50  50 
7.  SECULARITY      
M 2.30a 1.82b 1.70b 
SD 0.66  0.52  0.46 
n 47  50  50 
      
Note:  A four-point scale was used.  Means that do not share a common subscript within a 
column reliably (p<.05) differ from each other.  Higher scores indicate high authority, high 
dependence, high personal religiosity, low level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force, 
low level of Islamic piety, and low level of secularity. 
Thus, the key result was that while there was no group difference 
under the secularist, neutral, and Islamist conditions for Authority I, 
Authority II and Dependence, the significant group differences emerged 
under the three experimental conditions with regard to Religiosity I, 
Religiosity II, Devout Muslimness (Islamic Piety) and Secularity.  The 
significance levels also produced a remarkable result:  There is only less 
than 0.01 percent chance that a randomly selected individual would not 
change his view in accordance with the experimental conditions.  The field 
experiment clearly revealed the tremendous self-subversion in the public 
sphere in response to social pressures, leading to the polarization of Turkish 
society during the late 1990s:  secularists versus Islamists.  Being aware of 
such polarization, participants obviously had an idea about the Choice Under Pressure, 32 
characteristics of public opinion, and in particular, the degree to which it 
favors secularism or Islamism.  The polarization of Turkish society along the 
spectrum of secularism and Islamism inevitably put individuals in a difficult 
position, demanding from them to align with one side, depending upon the 
social context.  In particular, both secularist and Islamist activists pressure 
by-standers to align with their side so that they can claim public opinion 
strengthens their position on such controversial issues as veiling, religious 
schools, etc.  The alignment of the neutral condition with the secularist 
condition made it clear that participants had clearly identified the prevailing 
public opinion as secularist before the JDP came to power.  In other words, 
if an individual is in a particular setting, asking him to take a side about an 
issue that Islamists and secularists have opposing views, and if there is not 
enough clue to clearly read the setting as either Islamist or secularist, 
chances are that the setting is secular rather than Islamist.  The secularist 
establishment had enjoyed the prevailing secularist public opinion until the 
November 3, 2002 elections. 
 
In spite of the dominant secularist public discourse in Turkey, in the 
November 2002 elections, free of intimidations, the silent majority, 
encompassing huge self-subversion, rewarded the Islamist-rooted Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) with a decisive victory.  The election results 
reflected the grievances of the Turkish society, in particular, its 
disillusionment and frustration with the secularist politicians in ending 
poverty, corruption and the economic crisis of 2001.  The astonishing rise of 
JDP to power highlighted the growing influence of Islam on the Turkish 
society through its claim to be the legitimate representative of the 
disadvantaged despite the secularist establishment that fought hard to keep 
the political Islam out of the public realm. 
 
In order to appease the secularist establishment, especially the Turkish 
military that might initiate another coup, in the very first public speech after 
the elections, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, JDP’s leader, stressed that “We will not 
interfere with anyone else’s lifestyle,”
11 pointing out that the JDP will not 
attempt to institute an Islamic state.  Staring from its establishment, the JDP 
presented an image of moderation, (along with efficiency, transparency, and 
accountability), while distancing itself from its predecessor, the boldly pro-
Islamist RP.  Noticing this deviation, many secularists have claimed that the 
JDP including its leader Erdoğan himself engages in self-subversion, 
recalling his previous statements such as  “My point of reference is Islam.  
Democracy is not a goal but a means [to it.]”
12  Tayyip Erdoğan later 
                                                      
11 Hürriyet, 4 November 2002. 
12 See Derya Sazak, “Din ve Siyaset [Religion and Politics],” Milliyet, 2 February 2000.   33  Tolga Koker 
publicly denounced his previous statements by saying: “I certainly 
internalized democracy.” Despite the JDP’s rhetoric of change and 
moderation, the secularist establishment, specifically the army, is still 
suspicious of its “genuine” agenda.  With no change in their own publicly 
stated goals, the secularist establishment is determined to keep the Islamists 
symbols out of the public sphere.  The generals have already audaciously 
announced that:  “We don’t believe that [the JDP] changed.  The process of 
February 28 will last at least another thousand years,”
13 pointing to the 
possibility of another army takeover in case of a perceived challenge to 
Kemalist secularism.  After the JDP become the first Islamist party to form a 
government without a coalition partner, the contention between Islamists and 
secularist one way or another would occupy the public opinion. 
 
The veiling controversy quickly ignited, however, after the newly 
elected Islamist President of the Parliament, Bülent Arınç, attended a state 
ceremony to meet the President of Turkey, Ahmet Sezer with his veiled 
wife.
14  Sezer politely kept calm during the ceremony but two days later he 
publicly stated: “Veiling cannot be permitted in the public sphere.”
15  The 
reason why President Sezer did not react right away was that his quarrel with 
the Premier Bülent Ecevit in a NSC meeting revealed the level of political 
instability, sparking the worst economic crises in the history of the Turkish 
Republic in February 2001.  The financial crisis had already shifted the 
public opinion on how to alleviate the repercussions of the economic decay, 
putting the existing controversies between secularists and Islamists off the 
public agenda, at least for a while.   
 
The JDP government also recognized the urgency to stabilize 
economy and refrained from tackling any controversial issues such as veiling 
that might create political uncertainty, prolonging the economic crisis.   
Putting their promises to their Islamist supports aside, the JDP has 
implemented a successful economic stabilization policy, decreasing the 
inflation rate from 100 percent to around 10 percent within a year.  The 
JDP’s accomplishment in eradicating the economic crisis increased its 
prestige among the Turkish people, especially in the eyes of the 
conservatives.  The JDP’s success, especially in economic stabilization 
secured its place in Turkish politics.  In the local elections of the March 28, 
2004, the JDP expanded its legitimacy by receiving 42 percent of the entire 
                                                      
13 Radikal, 24 April 2002. 
14 Milliyet, 20 November 2002. 
15 Zaman, 25 November 2002. Choice Under Pressure, 34 
vote cast.
16  The local elections brought nearly 55 percent of all cities, 
including 57 of 81 provinces, under the leadership of mayors from the JDP.   
 
Envying JDP’s popularity, the secularist watchdog groups have 
continued to scrutinize the government’s every decision that possibly 
challenges the dominant secularist public discourse.  In response, the JDP’s 
party leadership has tried very hard to prevent its supporters from engaging 
in confrontational dialogue with the secularists in the public opinion.  This 
does mean that the secularism and Islamism in Turkey is passé.  The veiling 
controversy, for one, simmers on the sidelines of political and social debate.  
As the potential frictions between Islamists and secularists and the 
postponed adjustments for such frictions stayed off the public agenda, the 
secularist and Islamists currently seemed to reach a stalemate.  In an aura of 
standstill between Islamists and secularists and renewed economic optimism 
with a falling inflation rate and rising per capita income we conducted 
another field experiment in July-August 2004 to determine whether there is a 
change in the public opinion regarding Islamism and secularism.   
 
Table 3 summarizes some findings of the 2004 study.  The 
experimental conditions: Islamist, secularist or neutral, produced no 
significant statistical effect on authority, dependence.  This was consistent 
with the 1998 study’s results on dependence and authority.  With regard to 
religiosity and secularity, the 2004 study also produced similar results with a 
little difference.







                                                      
16 For election results, see Yenişafak, 30 March 2004. 
17 Recall that the effect of outfit type in the 1998 study produced extremely significant results 
on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity at the alpha level of p < .001.  In the 2004 field 
experiment, the effect of outfit type on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity also yielded 
statistically significant results at the alpha level of p < .002 for Religiosity I, p < .001 for 
Religiosity II, p < .001 for Secularity.  Specifically, for Religiosity I, the type of outfit led to 
significant difference, F (2,147) = 6.43, p < .002.  Tukey a tests also showed that participants' 
level of personal religiosity decreased under the secular and neutral conditions than under the 
Islamist condition (p < .05).  For Religiosity II, an ANOVA indicated that the type of outfit 
again was significant, F (2,147) = 7.93, p < .001. The level of endorsing religion as a social 
stabilizing factor increased under the Islamist condition than under the neutral and secularist 
conditions (p < .05).  The level of secularity also differed as a function of outfit type, F 
(2,147) = 7.10, p < .001.  Participants’ level of secularity rose higher under the neutral and 
secularist conditions than under the Islamist condition (p < .05).  35  Tolga Koker 
Table 3: Authority, Dependence, Religiosity, Islamic Piety and Secularity as a Function of 
Type of Outfit 
 _____________ 
“Islamist” 




1.  AUTHORITY I     
M  2.00 1.96 2.00 
SD  0.63 0.57 0.63 
n  50 50 50 
2.  AUTHORITY II     
M  2.70 2.60 2.66 
SD 0.54  .57  0.62 
n  50 50 50 
3.  DEPENDENCE      
M  2.10 2.06 2.00 
SD  0.58 0.68 0.53 
n  50 50 50 
4.   RELIGIOSITY I     
M 2.74a 2.54b 2.22b 
SD  0.69 0.78 0.70 
n  50 50 50 
5.  RELIGIOSITY II     
M 2.00a 2.18b 2.56b 
SD  0.72 0.69 0.73 
n  50 50 50 
6. DEVOTED MUSLIM      
M  1.96 2.10 2.24 
SD  0.66 0.70 0.74 
n  50 50 50 
7.  SECULARITY     
M 2.26a 1.84b 1.88b 
SD  0.66 0.50 0.65 
n  50 50 50 
     
Note:  A four-point scale was used.  Means that do not share a common subscript within a 
column reliably (p<.05) differ from each other.  Higher scores indicate high authority, high 
dependence, high personal religiosity, low level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force, 
low level of Islamic piety, and low level of secularity. 
 
Exposed to perceived pressures from the interviewers, the respondents 
in the later study are a little more forthcoming in revealing a different 
opinion, signaling an opening in the Turkish public sphere.  The major 
difference between two studies was on the devout Muslimness.  In the 1998 
study, when asked whether the respondents are devout Muslims or not, they 
tailored their public preferences according to the type of the interviewers’ 
outfit and in the neutral condition, they aligned with the secularist condition.  
Contrary to the 1998 study, when asked the same question, the respondents Choice Under Pressure, 36 
would not hesitate to reveal their Muslim selves in public under any 
conditions and there was no group difference.
18  In other words, under both 
secularist condition and neutral condition, they did not hesitate to profess 
their faith in public.   
 
This was a clear sign of emerging Islamic political identity in the 
public sphere in Turkey.  The incorporation of Islamic preferences into the 
public sphere was consistent with what Yavuz (2003) identified earlier:   
Private Muslim identity is “going public” as a result of increasing 
“opportunity spaces” in Turkey, i.e., the forms of social interaction 
introducing new possibilities of networking, resulting from shared meaning 
and associational life.  Yavuz (2003) also noted: “Islamic social movements 
represent the “coming out” of private Muslim identity in the public spaces” 
(24).  However, the respondents’ answers to Religiosity I and Religiosity II 
and Secularity make it clear that many would not publicly support such 
movements when faced with pressures from the secularist establishment, at 
least in the current state of Turkish democracy.  The new developments 
bolster this assertion. 
 
The clash between Islamists and secularists was about to explode in 
the search for a candidate for the presidential elections in 2007.  The JDP 
had enough votes in the parliament to elect its leader Erdoğan as the new 
president but the secularist establishment, especially the army has strong 
objections for Erdoğan and his veiled wife to represent the Turkish state 
founded on the principle of strict secularism.  In order to secured its place 
into core of the Turkish politics the JDP called for an early elections.  After 
receiving an overwhelming majority (47 percent ) of the votes in the early 
election of July 22, 2007,
19  The JDP even won a bigger majority of the seats 
in the parliament.  Yet, rather than endorsing its leader Erdoğan as the next 
president the JDP elected its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Addullah Gül as 
the new president of the Turkish Republic whose wife is also veiled.  With 
an assured confidence, the JDP attempted to resolve the veiling controversy 
through a constitutional amendment that allows female students to veil 
themselves in universities.  The secularist establishment was quick at 
                                                      
18 In the 1998 study, as previously stated, the level of Islamic piety differed as a function of 
type of outfit, F(2, 148) = 3.10, p < .05.  According to Tukey-a test, participants’ level of 
Islamic piety was lower under the secularist and neutral conditions than under the Islamist 
condition (p < .05).  In the 2004 study, the level of Islamic piety did not differ as a function of 
type of outfit, F(2, 147) = 1.959, p > .10.  According to Tukey-a test, contrary to the 1998 
results, in the 2004 field experiment, participants’ level of Islamic piety was not lower under 
the secularist, neutral and Islamist condition (p > .05). 
19 Milliyet, 23 July 2007. 
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reacting in opposing the amendment.  Even though the JDP successfully 
passed the constitutional amendment from the parliament with an additional 
support from the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (NAP), the 
Constitutional Court nullified the constitutional change, pleasing the 
secularist pressure groups.
20  Unable to carry out one of its main campaign 
promises, the JDP kept shying away from the controversial issues regarding 
secularism, repositioning itself as a conservative party with religious 
sensitivities.  And hence, JDP’s new stand slowed down the pace of the 
Islamist movement in Turkey.  In fact, the 2008 experiment confirmed that 
the public support for a strong Islamist movement among the masses even 
declined. 
 
Table 4 complies the result of the 2008 experiment.  As expected, 
there were no group differences with regard to authority, dependence.  In all 
the experiments, regardless of the experimental conditions, the participants 
revealed authoritarian preferences, confirming this particular characteristic 
of Turkish culture.  With regard to religiosity and secularity, the 2008 study 
yielded similar results to those of the previous studies with some subtle, yet 
important, differences.
21  In terms of religiosity and secularity, the 
experimental condition resulted in statically significant group differences: In 
neutral condition, the participants aligned with those in secularist condition 
against the ones facing Islamist pressure, depicting a decade-long 
polarization in Turkish public opinion.  Devout Muslimness again was the 
major difference among all the studies.  More than a decade ago, in 1998, the 
Islamist and secularist symbols produced a significant effect on the 
participants’ response to the question of their devout Muslimness.   
 
 
                                                      
20 Hürriyet, 13 June 2008. 
21 Recall that the effect of outfit type in both1998 and 2004 studies produced extremely 
significant results on Religiosity I, Religiosity II and Secularity at the alpha level of p < .001 
with the exception that the alpha level for Religiosity I was p < .002.  The 2008 study showed 
similar trends: the effect of outfit type produced extremely significant results on Religiosity I, 
Religiosity II and Secularity at the alpha level of not p < .001 but p < .01.  Note that the 
significance levels in all the corresponding tests except for Tukey’s a’s are always lower 
than p < .01.  The specific tests results are as follows: an ANOVA indicated that the type of 
outfit again was significant for Religiosity I, F (2,148) = 5.14, p < .01.  Tukey a tests also 
showed that participants' level of personal religiosity decreased under the secular and neutral 
conditions than under the Islamist condition (p < .05).  For Religiosity II, the type of outfit led 
to significant difference, F (2,148) = 5.89, p < .01. The level of endorsing religion as a social 
stabilizing factor increased under the Islamist condition than under the neutral and secularist 
conditions (p < .05).  The level of secularity also differed as a function of outfit type, F 
(2,148) = 5.41, p < .01.  Participants’ level of secularity rose higher under the neutral and 
secularist conditions than under the Islamist condition (p < .05).  Choice Under Pressure, 38 
Table 4: Authority, Dependence, Religiosity, Islamic Piety and Secularity as a Function 
of Type of Outfit 
 __________ 
“Islamist” 




1.  AUTHORITY I      
M 1.98  1.98  1.92 
SD 0.55  0.65  0.56 
n 50  50  50 
2.  AUTHORITY II      
M 2.80  2.82  2.62 
SD 0.53  0.52  0.73 
n 50  50  50 
3.  DEPENDENCE       
M 2.22  1.96  1.96 
SD 0.61  0.56  0.66 
n 50  50  50 
4.   RELIGIOSITY I      
M 2.70a 2.28b 2.26b 
SD 0.78  0.67  0.85 
n 50  50  50 
5.  RELIGIOSITY II      
M 2.16 a 2.34 b 2.40 b 
SD 1.54  0.71  0.83 
n 50  50  50 
6.  DEVOTED MUSLIM       
M 1.92 a 2.08 2.38 b 
SD 0.60  0.63  0.80 
n 50  50  50 
7.  SECULARITY      
M 2.30 a 1.80 b 1.90 b 
SD 0.61  1.04  0.67 
n 50  50  50 
      
Note:  A four-point scale was used.  Means that do not share a common subscript within a 
column reliably (p<.05) differ from each other.  Higher scores indicate high authority, high 
dependence, high personal religiosity, low level of seeing religion as a stabilizing social force, 
low level of Islamic piety, and low level of secularity. 
 
Recall that participants under the neutral condition had aligned with 
those under the secularist condition, indicating the dominance of the 
secularist public opinion.  In 2004, the experimental condition yielded no 
significant effect on the participants’ devout Muslimness.  This signaled the 
rising Islamic identity in the Turkish public sphere, a sign of weakening in 
the prevalence of the secularist dominance in the public discourse.  In other 
words, there was a slight opening in Turkish society with regard to public 
expression of religious identity, regardless of Islamists and secularist 
pressures. It indicated a tilted tendency towards a possible peaceful co-
existence of Islamism and secularism in Turkey.  However, the 2008 study 
showed the reversal of this trend.  The group difference between Islamist and 39  Tolga Koker 
secularist conditions remerged as the participants tailored their responses 
under perceived pressures, proving strong evidence on the polarization of the 
Turkish public opinion: Islamist vs. secularists.
22   
 
The overall response to devoted Muslimness under the neutral 
condition was interesting.  When faced no Islamist or secularist pressures, 
the participants aligned neither with Islamists nor with secularists, depicting 
how the Turkish people caught in-between the pressures from Islamists and 
secularists pressure groups.
23 In expressing their own individual faith in 
religion, free of (suggestive) perceived pressure, the participants revealed 
their own individual religious identity.  This is one of the indicators of which 
Turkish Islam is getting secularized at individual level as each day layman in 
Turkey is trying to cope with the demands of the modern life. 
 
In short, all the field experiments provide very strong evidence that 
the prevailing public opinion in Turkey is still very much secularist. The 
three field experiments documented this and showed that the dual preference 
model has significant relevance for the Turkish case.  In the next sections, I 
will theoretically analyze the possible outcomes for Turkey.   
 
6.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUAL  
 PREFERENCE  MODEL 
 
The existence of unstable equilibrium implies that self-subversion may lead 
to social discontinuities.  Once individuals with low thresholds for speaking 
out against the status quo trigger the others with high thresholds, a social 
movement may break out leading to a social change.  It is important to note 
that event small events which look trivial on the surface can change the 
thresholds of individuals, shifting the public opinion in an entirely different 
direction.  As an example from the current Turkish politics, when Prime 
Minister Ecevit who champions the secularist cause experienced serious 
health problems in June 2002, the secularist center-left core started to 
crumble due to the vacuum created in leadership.  This created an initial bias 
in the public opinion in favor of the Islamists, raising the political support 
for the Islamist-rooted JDP.  Prevailing public opinion will eventually play a 
                                                      
22 Like in the 1998 study and unlike in the 2004 study, the 2008 study showed that the level of 
Islamic piety differed as a function of type of outfit, F(2, 148) = 5.79, p < .05.  According to 
Tukey-a test, participants’ level of Islamic piety was lower under the secularist condition than 
under the Islamist condition (p < .05).   
23 According to Tukey-a test, contrary to the 1998 and 2004 results, in the 2008 field 
experiment, participants’ level of Islamic piety was not lower under the neutral than the 
Islamist and secularist conditions (p > .05). Choice Under Pressure, 40 
crucial role in unleashing long-term forces that will shape the majority’s 
private preferences.  Therefore, it may ultimately determine the future of the 
co-mingling of Islamism and secularism in Turkey via unanticipated social 
movements. Other than the persistence of the multiple equilbria in Turkey, 
there exist three possibilities.  The first is the complete domination of 
secularism over Islamism.  The second is the complete domination of 
Islamism over secularism.  The third is their peaceful co-existence.  The first 
possibilities entail a distinct corner equilibrium solution to the ongoing 
struggle between Islamists and secularists.  
 
6.1 Corner  Equilibrium  I:  Complete Secularization 
 
Pro-secularist self-subversion may result in complete secularization, 
the ultimate secularist goal, by completely disestablishing Islam.  In other 
words, the secularization thesis may work in practice and all religions, 
including Islam, may disappear.  Within the context of this paper, complete 
secularization refers to a corner equilibrium.   
 
  Figure 7:  Corner Equilibrium I   41  Tolga Koker 
Complete secularization can occur when secularists totally suppress 
Islamists.  In other words, the establishment of a corner equilibrium (i.e., 
complete secularization) necessitates the demise of the core of Islamist 
activists.  Such equilibrium will be achieved if the propagation curve moves 
up to 100.  As shown in Figure 7, it will destroy the preexisting unstable 
equilibrium B at 70 and the stable equilibrium A at 20 shown in Figure 6.  
There is now a unique equilibrium at 100, where widespread pro-secularist 
self-subversion will sustain the appearance of a unified secular Turkey.  If 
very few Islamist activists still publicly oppose, the equilibrium will be near 
a corner, accounting for the remaining weak opposition, questioning the 
legitimacy of Turkish secularism or its implementation. 
 
In its heydays in the early 1930, Kemalist core exerted enormous 
pressures on masses, increasingly shifting the public opinion towards 
support for complete secularization.  As an example from current Turkish 
politics, one can speculate that if the Islamists, represented by the Justice and 
Development Party, attempt to discard the secular constitution after winning 
the elections held on November 3
rd, 2002, the Kemalist military may 
consider a coup to reinstitute strict Turkish secularism, suppressing the 
Islamist hard core, and abolishing democratic parliamentary representation.  
Under a military regime, no Islamist pressure group will be able to openly 
challenge the secularist position, and its demise may take the form of its hard 
core activists’ going underground. 
 
6.2  Corner Equilibrium II: Complete Islamization 
 
Pro-Islamist self-subversion may result in complete Islamization.  A 
corner equilibrium solution as depicted by Figure 8 indicates such a case 
where the Islamists one would succeed in their stated goal of suppressing all 
secularist public opinion, including the secularist hard core represented by 
15 percent of the population with thresholds near zero.  In this case, the 
propagation curve will intersect the diagonal at 0 referring to complete 
Islamization if the propagation curve shifts downward, destroying the 
existing unstable equilibrium at 70 as well as the equilibrium at 80.  Thus, 
the only remaining public expectation is eventually self-fulfilling unanimous 
support for complete Islamization.  Such corner equilibrium points to a 
sustained appearance of unified Turkey under the Islamist rule with no 
representation of Turkish secularism in the public sphere.  If very few 
secularist activists still remain in open opposition the equilibrium will be 
near corner until the demise of the secularist core.   
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Figure 8:  Corner Equilibrium II 
 
In an Islamist sense, complete Islamization refers to the Islamic 
principles of jihad (holy war), i.e., the domination of Dar-ul Islam (House of 
Islam) over Dar-ul Harb (House of War--the non-Islamic world).  This 
radical interpretation of jihad asks for imposition of an Islamic worldview on 
everybody.  An attempt to complete Islamization has taken place in Iran 
following the revolution of 1979.  A newly formed Revolutionary Council, 
including many ulema (learned men of religion) assumed this task in the 
political, economic, social and cultural spheres of life, banning non-religious 
art, literature, and secular forms of entertainment.  The Council for Cultural 
Revolution established an Islamic University system with new Islamic 
curricula and textbooks, including the Islamization of economics courses. 
(Sohrab Behdad, 1995).  High-school textbooks were rewritten reflecting an 
Islamic worldview with the repetitive theme of integrating politics with 
religion in all social-science and history books, overemphasizing the 
submission to God’s will--the literal meaning of the word islam -- to create 
an “ideal” society interpreted by religious leaders (Siavoshi
   1995).   
Following the Iranian example through democratic means, the Turkish 
Islamists, led by the Justice and Development Party in power, may attempt 
to dismantle the secular establishment, suppressing the secularist hard core.  43  Tolga Koker 
Even under this extreme case, the defeated camp will continue to exist under 
suppressed conditions by going underground and/or moving out of the 
country in an attempt to fight for their cause relying on global networks and 
communication technology. 
 
6.3  Infinite Multiple Equilibria: Peaceful Co-Existence  
 
The disappearance of pro-secularist and pro-Islamist self-subversion 
presents itself as an “ideal” case in which the expected public opinion totally 
converges with the actual public opinion.  In this ideal case, shown in Figure 
9, the propagation curve will overlap with the 45 degree diagonal, producing 
an infinite number of multiple equilibria.  That implies, at any given time, no 
individual feels pressured to conceal his genuine preferences.   
 
Figure 9:  Infinite Multiple Equilibria with Peaceful Coexistence 
 
This is only possible in a pluralistic society where there is a strong 
social consensus on the role of Islam and secularism in social life.  A truly 
democratic regime with a strong civil society may increase the likelihood of 
this case.  Peaceful coexistence requires established democratic rights.  In Choice Under Pressure, 44 
order to assure such rights, there must be either institutional guarantees in 
place for the freedom of speech or the social consensus for expressive 
diversity with a perfect ethic of tolerance in the society.  This, of course, 
refers to a utopia where even the most democratic countries such as the 
United States find it difficult to sustain.  Turkey’s constrained democracy 
with authoritarian overtones as of 2006 especially makes this possibility less 




The dual preference model depicts the possible responses (i.e., exit, 
sincere voice and self-subversion) to the pressures from two opposing 
interest groups, pinpointing self-subversion as the superior option.   
Islamist pressures lead to pro-Islamist self-subversion while secularist 
pressures induced pro-secularist self-subversion. The model also 
posits the unintended consequences of self-subversion:  Massive self-
subversion results in multiple social equilibria with shifting public 
opinion.  The field experiments provided strong evidence for the 
current polarization of the Turkish public opinion, harboring multiple 
equilibria, showing how Turkish society got caught in-between as 
Islamists and secularists have pushed for favorable corner equilibrium 
to achieve their own distinct goals. Self-subversion conceals the 
distribution of private preferences, making impossible to predict the 
future.  All that is certain for now is that the Turkish posterity will free 
itself from the chains of the schizophrenic past to the extent that 
secularism and Islamism stop creating pressures, generating anxieties, 
guilt and cognitive dissonances, making self-subversion 
inconsequential.  For this, both Islamists and secularists must realize 
their peripeteia, releasing Turkish people from being prisoners of 
themselves.  
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Part I:  Background Questions 
Age   _________Profession  ______________________ 
 
Sex    (   )  Male  (   )  Female     
 
Education  (   )  None  (   )  Primary School  (   )  Secondary School
    (   )  High School  (   )  University    (   )  Graduate School 
 
In what type environment did you grow up? 
  (   )  Village  (   )  Town  (   )  City (   ) İzmir, Ankara, İstanbul 
 
What is your monthly household income?   
(Values were adjusted for the 2004 and 2008 Studies) 
 
  (   )  Less than 25 Million TL   (   )  B/w 25-50 Million TL   
  (   )  B/w 100-200 Million TL    (   )  Over 200 Million TL   
 
 
Part II:  Do you Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; or, Strongly Disagree with the following 
questions? 
 
1.  Discipline and respect for authority are the most important values a child has to learn. 
2.  In a heated debate I am generally so preoccupied with what I am going to say next that I 
forget to listen what others say. 
3.  If you want something to be done, you should try to do it yourself than waiting for help 
from others. 
4.  A person can lead a good life even if he does not have strong religious beliefs. 
5.  Religion is an indispensable force for stability and social harmony. 
6.  I consider myself a devout Muslim. 
7.  I consider myself a secular citizen. 
 
Part III:  
 
What do you think about us? 





For official use only 
Place    _______________    Date  _____________    
 
Experimental condition  (   )  Secularist     (   )  Islamist    (   )  
Neutral 
 
                                                      
* All the (1998, 2004, and 2008) Questionnaires were more comprehensive than the one given 
above.  Choice Under Pressure, 46 
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